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CHINA'S FOREIGN AID IN 1979-80*
By John Franklin Copper
Introduction
The most salient change in China's foreign aid progr&m during
1979-80 was the fart that China became a net capital borrower, but
continued its foreign aid giving in that context. In fact, China became
a major recipient of grants and loans during the period, having
established a policy of obtaining development funds from almost any
source and in almost unlimited amounts. According to the ViceChairman of the State Planning Commission, China was preparing to
borrow as much as $20 billion by 1985. 1
China's entrance into the game of soliciting aid even evoked
some concern from other developing countries that China may cause
less funds to be available to other nations, especially from international lending institutions where China is able to borrow in
proportion to its population. 2 This concern prompted the World Bank
to try to dispel rumors to the eEect that China, as a new borrower
and based upon its large population and low per capita income, was
entitled to as much as $1 billion of the $12 billion the W.:>rld Bank
has available for the poorest nations. 3
Japan and the U.S. were the largest suppliers of capital to China,
most of which was granted in the form of low interest loans and
deferred credits. Since the interest on the loans was below the rate of
inflation and some of the deferred payments were without interest,
the grant factor on these transactions was considerable. The same
was true of a host of loans China received from international lending
even obtained credit from
some smaller- countries
institutions. China
~

* For assessments of China's foreign aid before 1979, see the following works by
the author: CHINA'S FOREIGN AID: AN INSTRUMENT OF PEKING'S FOREIGN
POLICY (Le:r.:ington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1976); "China's Foreign Aid in 1976,"
Current Scene, Vol. XV, Nos. 6 and 7, June-July 1977; "China's Foreign Aid in 1977,"
Current Scene, Vol. XVI, Nos. 8 and 9, August-September 1978; and "China's Foreign
Aid in 1978," Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies,
University of Maryland Law School, No. 8, 1979.
1. Times (London), February 8, 1980, p. 3.
2. India, among other nations, expressed this concern. See Financial Times
(London), November 13, 1980, p. 4.
3. Washington Post, June 28, 1980, p. 11. It is worth noting in this context that
China claimed $230 as its annual per capita income, while the World Bank estimate
was $460. Acceptance of the former figure would give China an additional advantage
in borrowing from this institution.
(1)
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and some nations that are not considered rich nations, such as
Australia and Argentina. 4
Because of the emphasis put upon domestic economic development, much less was said about economic assistance to other
countries by Chinese leaders or by the media in China. Thus, while
China has always been reluctant to announce its aid promises for a
variety of reasom;, including the fact that it wants to avoid
comparisons with aid given by the richer countries and maintain the
image of giving aid without strings attached, it has recently become
even more reticent in providing details about its aid giving. Hence
officially announced bilateral aid in 1979 and 1980 was down from
previous years. (See Table 1). In 1979 China provided between $99
and $112 million in aid to other countries that it or the recipient
country provided figures on, and this included only two nations. (See
Table 2). In 1980 the figure was smaller, or a total of $89.5 million in
official aid, with four recipients. (See Table 3). And in the case of only
one of the recipients during this two year period was the announcement made in China - an interest free loan to Zimbabwe.
On the other hand, Beijing made public most of its RP.d Cross and
other emergency aid, which exceeded previous years, and, if added to
China's official aid giving, would bring the total of officially
announced aid up slightly. Funds China provided to U.N.-affiliated
and other international organizations were considerably larger than
emergency aid, especially in 1980, and, if added to China's aid
program, would increase the total figure noticeably. Finally, if the
costs borne by China for resettling ethnic Chinese among the
Indo-Chinese refugees is counted, China's aid program increases by
several fold. Further details on these points are provided in
subsequent pages.
----~n- past years, official aid figures tell very little about China's
foreign aid program and during 1979-80 this remained true. Most of
China's aid giving was unannounced and its real aid exceeded by
several fold the amount that can be documented in terms of values
and conditions or terms. On the other hand, like its official aid
giving, China's real aid also declined appreciably. Two factors explain
this drop: (1) the termination of aid to Vietnam and Albania - the
, 4. In June 1980 Argentina extended China credits totalling $300 million to buy
non-traditional goods. The rate of interest was 7V2 percent for capital goods and 31/2
percent for durable and semi-durable goods, and the repayment period was 81/2 and 10
years respectively. For further details see New China News Agency (hereinafter
NCNA), June 7, 1980 cited in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (hereinafter
FBIS), June 9, 1980, p. 13.
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two largest recipients of Chinese aid in the late 1960s and early
1970s - in 1978, and; (2) the greater concern over domestic economic
development and the fact that Chinese leaders perceived that they
could better use the funds at home. There may also have been some
apprehension over public opinion vis-a-vis China's aid giving in view
of the fact that much publicity was being given to domestic economic
growth and because China is a poor country. 5
Hostile relations with Vietnam and Albania account for the fact
that in terms of regions or blocs, China's aid giving during 1979-80
reflected a major shift in direction. Very little aid was given during
the period to communist bloc countries. In fact, North Korea was
probably the only real recipient of Chinese foreign aid and there is
real doubt whether this aid was very significant. Pyongyang obtained
petroleum from China at "friendly prices" and China reported that a
chemical plant and an oil pump and nozzle plant built with Chinese
aid went into operation in North Korea in 1980.6 Suggesting that this
aid was not very important, Pyongyang reported that it was receiving
much more aid from the Soviet Union and was "dissatisfied" with
China's aid. 7
In addition to these donations China announced a one time grant
of emergency assistance to Yugoslavia. 8 Beijing also claimed to have
finished a hospital in Afghanistan after the installation of the
pro-Soviet communist regime there; and it reported giving food,
medicine and other aid to Vietnamese citizens in occupied areas in
Vietnam during the war between the two countries in early 1979.9
These latter donations, however, cannot be regarded as genuine
foreign aid because they are too small and used only one time grants,
and because they cannot be confirmed.
Whereas China's aid to communist nations declined, its aid to
insurgent groups increased over previous years - even compared
5. See John F. Copper, "China's Foreign aid in 1978," Occasional Papers/Reprint,
Services in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Marjlaud
November 8, 1979 (No. 29).
6. For details on oil deliveries, which increased from 700,000 tons in 1979 to 2
million tons in 1980, resulting from the completion of oil refinery in North Korea near
the Chinese border (possibly with some Chinese assistance), see Asia 1981 Yearbook
(Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1981), p. 173. The aid projects are
mentioned by Beijing Radio, cited in Young C. Kim, "North Korea in 1980: The Son
Also Rises," Asian Survey 21 (1981): 122, and NCNA, August 13, 1980, cited in China
Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7.
7. Kim, "North Korea in 1980," p. 123.
8. NCNA, November 9, 1980, cited in FBIS, November 12, 1980, p. A3.
9. NCNA, October 13, 1980, cited in FBIS, October 15, 1980, p. 13.
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with the 1960s, when China claimed as a major tenet of its foreign
policy support of "wars of national liberation." The surprising or at
least interesting thingJ about this aid was that it was almost
exclusively aimed at countering communist regimes. The situation in
Indochina, where China perceived that Vietnam had become a
hegemonist power working in conjunction with the Soviet Union, the
Kremlin's invasion of Afghanistan and the threat that posed to South
Asia and the Middle East, and China's continued dispute with the
Soviet Union all explain the change in China's aid giving.
China's military aid also shows an increase over previous years .
. Pakistan was the major recipient, receiving increased amounts of
arms from China in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of
Mghanistan: Egypt also received significant quantities of arms from
China during the period .. Several other countries recieved lesser
amounts of weapons aid.
In terms of the total number of recipient nations, China's aid
giving was down slightly during 1979-80. In 1979 China render~d
assistance of some type that could be documented to 41 nations (See
Table 4) and in 1980 to 40 nations. (See Table 5). This compares to 53
recipients in 1978 and 49 in 1977. The lesser number of recipients
could well be explained by the fact that China is now saying less
about its aid and many smaller projects may have gone unreported by
either China or the recipient nation. In addition, new recipients get
more attention and say more about aid when it is obtained for the
first time: there were no new nations added to China's list of aid
recipients during the period. Yet another factor is the change in
attitude by Western nations that no longer see China's aid activities
as a threat or an effort to foster anti-imperialist "wars of national
liberation." Finally, there is considerable evidence that in the context
of its own concern about economic development China was simply
less willing to extend aid to other countries even when this involved
only small expenditures.
Medical and agricultural aid remained popula:r, although they
formed the mainstay of China's foreign assistance program only in
Mrica. Roads and water and electricity projects also remained
popular kinds of aid in African, Middle Eastern, as well as some
Asian countries. While the strategic value of roads is important as
perceived by the Chinese leaders, Beijing still regards a physical
presence of its workers, technicians and advisors in foreign countries
which road work provides more crucial. On the other hand, both
medical and agricultural aid as well as project aid in general afforded
this presence during 1979-80 more than road construction.

CmNA's FoREIGN

Am

IN

1979-80

5

Building construction also remained a popular part of China's aid
effort, and because of it China's aid giving also took on a new slant.
In some countries where China has constructed buildings in the past
as part of its eononomic aid program, it is now signing contracts for
payment. Most noteworthy are several projects in North Yemen,
including an agreement with that government on establishing a joint
building-engineering corporation. China also signed an agreement
establishing a joint venture furniture construction project with North
Yemen, and an agreement with the government of Iraq to build
several bridges, including one large bridge over the Tigrus River for
payment.'0
According to a Chinese source, Beijing has signed more than
forty construction contracts abroad, mostly with Middle Eastern
countries. 11
Beijing also reported that the China Construction Corporation,
which is the major builder overseas, employs more than 80,000
architects and workers and has experience in more than fifty
countries.' 2 One may conclude from this that China has in at least
one respect profited from its foreign aid program and may in the
future be expected to utilize more if its expertise gained from foreign
aid projects to make profits and attain needed foreign exchange.
This is not, however, to say that China's foreign aid program is
not generous or not as generous as it was in the past. Most of China's
aid continues to be given in the form of low or non-interes~ bearing
loans, or in the form of gifts. It is also generous considering China
itself is a poor country. On the other hand, as 'in the past, since
Chinese aid is seldom given in foreign currencies and is almost
always tied to Chinese products, there is o~ly limited choice in terms
of goods or supplies for the recipient when compared to most Western
aid programs. Also, repayment continues to be in goods rather than
in currency - which in the case of Western economic assistance
programs is affected by inflation to the advantage of the recipient;
this drastically limits the grant factor of Chinese aid.
During the period under survey China rendered more emergency
assistance than has been the practice in the past. In 1979 the total to
six recipients was close to one-half million dollars. (See Table 6). In
1980 it totalled more than a million dollars to six recipients. (See
Table 7). The explanation for this may be that emergency aid
provides Iflore publicity and good will for the amount of the donation,
10. NCNA, May 27, 1980, cited in FBIS, May 29, 1980, p. Al.
11. NCNA, May 22, 1980, cited in FBIS, May 27, 1980 p. 13.
12. Ibid.
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while it is considered humanitarian and is less likely to be questioned
by China's population or opponents of Deng Xiaoping's economic
modernization program - who can point out the contradiction
between the almost singular aim of economic growth and even having
a foreign airl program.
In this connection China set a precedent in giving financial
assistance to the United Nations and several U.N.-affiliated or other
international organizations. While Beijing had given aid funds to the
U.N. in the past, it was for the purpose of transferring funds to a
specific country where China had no direct contacts or where the
international body could do it more effectively. 13 During 1980, China
donated a total of over $4.75 million to a number of U.N.-affiliate
organizations, and other international bodies. (See Table 8). Again
this seems to reflect an effort by Chinese leaders to gain more
publicity for the aid they give and to disguise it from their own
population to avoid possible political opposition. It may also reflect an
effort to gain a bigger voice in the United Nations and to continue to
make a bid for leadership of the Third World nations, while China's
trade increases with the developed Western nations and while China
competes with Third World Countries for loans from the developed
countries and international lending agencies. Some of the donations
also reflect an effort by Chinese leaders to draw global attention to
the refugee problems spawned by the Vietnamese invasion of
Kampuchea and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both of which
Chinese leaders have strongiy criticized. In any event, the reader
must keep in mind that the amount of aid China has given to the
U.N. and other international organizations does not approach the
amount it has received from international lending institutions.
Related to the aid China provided to the U.N. during the period
under study and its motives behind this aid, is the fact that China
has accepted a sizeable number of refugees from Indochina during the
last two to three years. Although most were ethnically Chinese who
did not have citizenship locally, Beijing sought to underscore the fact
that Vietnam was the cause of the refugee problem which created
severe financial hardship for China. In mid-1980, a Chinese representative at the United Nations declared that up to that date China
had already accepted 260,000 Indochinese refugees and that the
Chinese government had paid $580 million for their relief and
13. In 1978 China provided economic aid to Laos through the U.N. This was done
for convenience reasons. For further details, see Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978,"
supra note 5, at 5.
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resettlement. 14 One reason for giving attention to the issue and
China's costs relates both to good publicity for China and a bad image
for Vietnam as well as an effort to enlist aid from the U.N. and other
global organizations for refugee costs - which China succeeded in
doing, though by the end of 1980 to-date only in part.
In the following sections China's aid to insurgency movements
and its aid to three geographic/political regions - non-Communist
Asia, Africa and other areas - are discussed in greater detail. Here
some of the special facets of China's aid program as well as Beijing's
strategic views and concerns become evident.
Aid to Insurgency or Guerrilla Groups
In terms of its costs China probably rendered as much aid to
insurgency groups as to nations in any of the geographic/political
regions to be discussed below. On the other hand, the value and even
the results or the usefulness of this aid is extremely difficult to
assess. A good portion of this aid consisted of weapons, though
equipment, medicine, food and even military advisors and training
were also provided. In at least one case it was reported that China
was paying salaries for what amounted to mercenary soldiers.
All of the insurgency forces or liberation groups to receive
Chinese assistance were in South or Southeast Asia or Africa. (See
Tables 9 and 10). Chinese aid was given in both large and small
amounts and to groups with varying purposes, though it is noteworthy that most of China's aid in this category was aimed at countering
Soviet supported, or Soviet protege governments. The rest was aimed
at supporting black Africa, though in terms of amounts this was
much less. Virtually none was aimed at overthrowing pro-Western
regimes or colonial powers.
The area where China provided the most extensive support to
rebel forces was in Indochina: Kampuchea and Laos. China's purpose
was to threaten and attempt to overthrow the governments of these
two countries, which are communist but are in the Soviet-Vietnamese
camp. The significant quantity of aid that China purveyed to
opposition forces in these two countries must be explained in
strategic terms: China feels threatened by the Soviet military
buildup in Asia and sees the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and these
two nations' growing influence in the region as an effort to contain
China as well as deny Beijing a sphere of influence.
14. NCNA, May 26, 1980, cited in FBIS, May 27, 1980, p. 13.
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Elsewhere in the region China terminated or cut back its support
to rebel forces and promised leaders of several non-communist
Southeast Asian countries that it would not render assistance to
communist insurgency movements there. 15 Confirming these statements in mid-1979, China specifically stated - ~nd there was no
contradictory evidence - that it was no longer providing aid to
communist movements in Thailand or Malaysia. 16 At about the same
time, Beijing cut its aid drastically to the Burmese Communist Party,
which China has long supported; as of mid-1980 its aid included only
certain supplies and no weapons. 17 Chinese leaders apparently
wanted to concentrate their efforts on countering the SovietVietnamese threat and sought to ally with local governments to do
this. More specifically, Chinese aid to Pol Pot's forces in Kampuchea
and its cutting of assistance to communist insurgency movements in
Thailand and Malaysia seemed to be aimed at preventing the
Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin government from winning diplomatic recognition from countries in the region. In short, China
wanted to foster doubt concerning the government's control of the
country.
The second area of importance where China aided an insurgency
movement was in South Asia, namely Afghanistan. Much of China's
help, however, was given to Pakistan in the form of direct military
assistance. China's aid to Muslim rebels in Afghanistan was not very
significant in terms of its amount, value, or effect. The only other
area where China was actively supporting insurgency movements or
helping wars of national liberation during 1979-80 was in Africa
where China provided help to forces led by Robert Mugabe that
sought to overthrow the government of Rhodesia (early during the
period) and to the Southwest African People's Organization (SW APO)
which was engaged in guerrilla warfare against South Africa.
The most extensive aid given to any insurgency or revolutionary
force during the period went to Pol Pot's forces operating in Western
Kampuchea and eastern Thailand against the Vietnamese-backed
Heng Samrin government and Vietnamese troops stationed in the
country. Early in 1979 Thai sources reported that China had fortified
15. Derek Davies, "Shadow of the Kremlin," Far Eastern Eonomic Review, August
24, 1979, p. 21.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid; John McBeth, "New Force in The Opium Trade," Far Eastern Economic
Review, July 25, 1980, p. 28. The latter notes that the Burmese Communist Party has
been forced to get into the opium selling business because China withdrew its annual
grant of $7.48 million.
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and manned the island of Khemera Phumin off the coast of
Kampuchea, which was a transit point for Chinese weapons and
supplies going to Khmer Rouge forces. 18 According to Prince Sihanouk, Deng Xiaoping told him that China was also sending arms and
supplies to Pol Pot's forces through Thailand - with the permission
of the Thai government - though Bangkok denied this. 19 Significant
Chinese aid deliveries to the Khmer Rouge were confirmed by
Vietnamese, Soviet and various Western sources. According to a
Vietnamese source the amount of Chinese aid going to Pol Pot was
"huge"; moreover, it included military advisors- some of whom were
captured by the Vietnamese, including a general.Z0
During 1980 China also donated money and supplies to U.N. and
other international organizations to aid Kampuchean refugees,
apparently for the purpose of sustaining Pol Pot's forces, or to involve
global institutions in the conflict. In any cas~, Vietnam and the Heng
Samrin government complained about international aid efforts,
which they said augmented Pol Pot's strength. Vietnam lent
confirmation to the effectiveness of this aid, and to the contention
that Chinese aid was being sent through Thailand, when in June
Vietnamese forces crossed the Thai border, after which Phnom Penh
described the incursion as a "self-defense effort" intended to protect
the sovereignty of Kampuchea. 2 ' At nearly the same time wellsupplied and well-equipped Khmer Rouge troops attacked a train in
central Kampuchea, killing 200 Vietnamese troops and civilians,
thereby demonstrating their ability to operate throughout much of
the country in strength. 22
According to one source, by late 1980 China had armed from 10
to 15 thousand Khmer guerrillas in Kampuchea (of a total force of 30
thousand), both by planting arms and supplies there before the
Vietnamese invasion in early 1979 and through aid deliveries since. 23
18. The Bangkok Post, February 1, 1979, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle and
Documentation," Tr.e China Quarterly, 78 (1979): 420. Another source cites Mu lsland
off Koh King as a transfer point of Chinese weapons and supplies. See Kessings
Contemporary Archives 25 (1979): 29619. Still another source says Chinese supplies
were off loaded from a large ship off the southwest coast of Kampuchea possibly in Thai
waters, into small boats. The Guardian, March 2, 1979 cited in Kessing's Contemporary
Archives 25 (1979); 29619.
19. U.S. News and World Report, February 17, 1979, p. 39.
20. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves, 25 (1979): 29615.
21. Michael Leifer, "Kampuchea in 1980: The Politics of Attrition," Asian Survey,
21 (1981): p. 94.
22. Ibid.
23. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 168.
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During 1979-1980 indications were that China was having no
difficulty sending arms and equipment to Khmer forces and was even
able to deliver arms through Laos. 24
On the other hand, while Vietnamese forces were not able to
pacify all of the country and were unsuccessful in their efforts to cut
off and contain the Khmer Rouge, neither were Pol Pot's forces able
to launch a major offensive. Meanwhile, Vietnamese troops were
provided with fresh weapons and supplies direct from the Soviet
Union via Kampuchea's southern ports. 25
Thus, one of China's biggest aid operations during the period
under study must be termed as inconclusive. Beijing was able
through its aid efforts to sustain Pol Pot's forces and prevent the total
consolidation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces. In this way China
probably precluded the pro-Vietnam government in Kampuchea
becoming legitimate and recognized. Also, through its aid to Pol Pot
China cost Vietnam and the Soviet Union much larger amounts of
money to support the other side. 1' This, followed by the Chinese
invasion of Vietnam in early 1979, which caused inestimatable
damage, has engendered serious economic concern in Vietnam. 27
During 1979, because of an increased Vietnamese and Soviet
presence in Laos and virtual control over the Laotian government by
those two countries (especially through the presence of an estimated
40,000 Vietnamese soldiers in Laos), relations between Laos and
China turned sour. In this context it was reported that China had
"mobilized" - vis. armed, equipped and trained - large numbers of
Hmong (Meo) and Lu minority people in Laos to fight guerrilla war
in the northern part of the country and was even paying some of
them a salary of around $30 per month. 28 China's efforts were
24. National Review, April 13, 1979, p. 466.
25. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 168.
26. One source put direct Soviet aid to Vietnam at $2 million per day. See Justus
M. van der Kroef, "From Phnom Penh to Kabul: The Soviets New Asian Gambit,"
International Security Review, 6 (1981): p. 14.
27. The damage caused to the Vietnamese economy by China's invasion in early
1979 is huge by any estimate. According to ABC News (T.V. broadcast seen in
Memphis, Tennessee), August 14, 1979, China caused $100 million in damage in Lon
Son in one day during the war. During 1980 reports on Vietnam's economic situation
were consistently dreary: noting that food rations had been cut, funds were unavailable
to repair war damage, black marketing was flourishing, and defections from the
military had increased. See for example, Douglas Pike, "Vietnam in 1980: The
·
Gathering Story?" Asian Survey, 21 (1981).
28. Nayan Chanda "A Nonchalant Revolution", Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 28, 1979, p. 22.
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confirmed in official references by the Laotian government to the
"enemy's fomentation of disturbances" and "international reactionaries who were trying to swallow up the country." 29 In September an
editorial in a Loatian paper accused China directly of sending
"traitorous lackeys" into Laos to "sow discord." 30
Later in the year it was said that China had organized and
trained a division of 4,000 guerrilla fighters comprised of Laos and
Meos, which it sent into northern Laos. 31 There was also evidence
that this was an ongoing policy: late in the year China accepted a
number of Laotian refugees (as many as 10,000)- but only young men
- from camps in Thailand for resettlement in China. 32 At about this
same time a Khmer Rouge radio broadcast declared that a Lao
Socialist Party had been established in Laos (presumably with
Chinese help) to fight Vietnamese occupation troops. 33
In reaction, the Laotian government a~cused China of massing
troops on its border, and called on Beijing to end its foreign aid
program in Laos. 34 (China's official aid to Laos for all practical
purposes had already been terminated.) The government also moved
closer to Vietnam and the Soviet Union, while getting increasing
quantities of aid from the latter. 35
Beginning in 1980 there were reports of a unifying of right and
left-wing resistance to the Vietnamese military presence in Laos. 36 In
mid-year a Khmer Rouge radio broadcast from China announced the
formation of the Lao National Liberation Front and during the rest of
the year commented on its "victories."37 At about this same time
China's official news agency started publishing reports of insurgency
in Laos, indicating open and official support for guerrilla groups
acting against the Laotian government and Vietnamese military
forces there. 38 In September, Agence France-Presse reported that four
Lao opposition groups had joined to form the Lao People's National
29. This statement. was made by Premier Kaysone. See Asia 1980 Yearbook, p.
220.
30. Siang Pasason (Vientaine), September 25, 1979, cited in Ibid, p. 221.
31. Asia Yearbook 1980, p. 222, citing a "Bangkok source."
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid, p. 221.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid, p. 222.
36. Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo), January 20, 1980, cited in Stanley S. Bedlington,
"Laos in 1980: The Portents are Ominous," Asian Survey, 21 (1981): 109.
37. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 182.
38. Bedlington, "Laos in 1980," p. 108.
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Liberation front and that the latter's efforts were being coordinated
with t}:10se of the Khmer Rouge. 39
However, in counterposition to what the above indicates there
was no hard evidence that insurgency had become an unmanageable
problem in Laos. Also, as already noted the government of Laos
received increasing amounts of Soviet aid during the period. Clearly
there was no indication that China was going to match the military
equipment given by the Soviet Union to government forces. Thus,
China appeared to want to support a guerrilla war rather than a
conventional war, while tying up the opposition movements in Laos
and Kampuchea. Again, as in the case of Kampuchea, it is difficult to
assess China's success so far or forecast future results.
China's aid to guerrilla forces in Afghanistan is even more
difficult to analyze than its aid to insurgency forces in Kampuchea or
Laos. One month after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan U.S. officials reported that Chinese leaders were willing
to increase their deliveries of small arms to Moslem rebels in
Afghanistan. 40 According to this same source China was also
supplying weapons to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Two other
sources, however, questioned, or at least played down, China's arms
aid to Afghan rebels. One cited four nations thought to be purveyors
of weapons, noting that all had denied it: China, Egypt, Pakistan,
and the U.S. 41 The other source said that China was "helping with
small arms" - but went on to add that its weapons aid was "not very
much."42
Shortly thereafter the Kremlin accused China and Pakistan of
sending weapons, in addition to "well trained saboteurs and bandits"
into Afghanistan. 43 Soviet charges of Chinese involvement continued
and were subsequently taken up by the Afghan government which
also accused China of training insurgents."44 Beijing, however, denied
both indictments. Later it was charged that China had established
bases in Pakistan to train saboteurs and terrorists for use in
Afghanistan, but again Chinese leaders denied such reports. 45

39. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 182.
40. Facts on File, 40 (1980): 31.
41. Asian Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1980, p. 1.
42. K. Wafadar, "Afghanistan in 1980: The Struggle Continues," Asian Survey, 21
(1981): 197.
43. Pravda, January 28, 1980, cited in Facts on File, 40 (1980): 67.
44. FBIS, January 11, 1980, p. F8, citing a Reuters broadcast.
45. FBIS, January 21, 1980, p. F3, citing a Reuters broadcast.
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By late 1980 less was heard about China's aid to insurgents,
apparently meaning that it was not terribly significant, or that China
had terminated its help to Afgan rebels - though more likely the
former. Chinese leaders probably perceived that its aid alone would
have little effect, and, therefore, took a wait-and-see attitude, hoping
that the U.S. and some other countries would do more. Beijing may
also have perceived that it could be more effective by limiting its
direct aid to the Afgan rebels while providing military aid to
Pakistan, which as will be seen in the next section, was quite
substantial. This tack, from China's point of view, probably guaranteed that it would not be acting alone, and, therefore, that it did not
have to worry about retaliation from the Soviet Union or a direct
confrontation with the Kremlin. Unlike the situation in Southeast
Asia, Afghanistan's small border with China did not provide a supply
route for Chinese weapons and supplies ancl was early on secured by
Soviet forces. Also, Beijing probably observed that the situation in
Afghanistan had already attracted considerable international attention and was very detrimental to Moscow's global image, thus China's
aid was unnecessary and may have been seen to give Moscow an
excuse for a presence in Afghanistan.
Elsewhere, China provided assistance to several insurgency
groups or movements in Africa, though information is sparse on
Beijing's activities there. In early 1979 Chinese Vice-Premier Li
Xiannian visited Africa and met with Robert Mugabe, leader of
ZANU, the movement to "liberate" Rhodesia. Li reportedly promised
Mugabe further arms aid including military advisors. 46 This report is
borne out by the fact that after Mugabe came to power relations with
China were good and Beijing made a meaningful (large by Chinese
standards) promise of economic assistance to his government. (This
aid is discussed in a following section.)
During the same visit Li also promised aid to the Southwest
African People's Organization (SWAPO), though again no details
concerning the size or value of this aid were made available. 47
Chinese leaders obtensibly wanted to maintain to some degree their
reputation as a supporter of black Africans while providing an
alternative to Soviet aid to SWAPO. Beijing may have chosen to
announce this aid to counter charges made by the Kremlin during the
year concerning China's trade with South Africa.

46. "Quarterly Chrmiicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, 78 (1979): 418.
47. Ibid.
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China also rendered assistance to other African groups as
reflected in the presence of an estimated 500 Chinese military
advisors on the continent. 48 Clearly not all of these, and probably not
even a sizeable majority, were assisting national armies. China
wanted to keep its aid to such groups secret in view of its efforts to
improve its ties with Western nations and its desire to be seen as a
legitimate and law abiding member of the world community.
Aid to Non-Communist Asian Nations
China officially provided economic aid to five non-Communist
countries during 1979 and six during 1980. (See Tables 11 and 12). 49
All of these nations had received Chinese assistance before, although
Thailand had received only Red Cross emergency assistance on a one
time basis in 1978.50 Although the number of African nations to
receive Chinese assistance during the period was much larger,
non-Communist nations received bigger donations and as a bloc
received more. The strategy behind China's aid giving in this region
seems to relate in part to offsetting India's influence on the South
Asia subcontinent - a constant goal of Chinese foreign policy
decision makers. It also related to the conflicts in Southeast Asia;
more particularly the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (though
clearly this goes further in explaining China's aid to insurgency
groups), and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - especially in
China's military aid to Pakistan.

48. David D. Newsom, "communism in Africa," African Report, January-February
1980, p. 47. The author was formerly U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs and this
article is based upon his testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on October 18, 1979, thus the figure cited should be
regarded as an official U.S. Department of State estimate.
49. Two more non-Communist Asian countries may be added to the list of
recipients of Chinese aid during 1979-80. China reported handing over a hospital built
with Chinese aid in Afghanistan in early 1979; however, it is unclear if this was
anything more than formalizing an earlier agreement and perhaps attempting to gain
some publicity for a project finished months earlier. See New China News Agency,
March 6, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7. Afghanistan was not
technicially a communist country at that time. As noted in the introduction it was also
reported that China turned over a hospital to the Afghanistan government in 1980. It
was also reported that China had made an agreement with the government of the
Philippines to supply that country with 1.2 million tons of petroleum at "friendship
prices." See Financial Times (India) July 9, 1979, p. 3. By most accounts this would not
be considered economic aid.
50. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5, Table 4.
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Pakistan was the largest recipient of Chinese assistance during
the period, the majority of China's aid to Pakistan consisting of arms
and other military aid. Moreover, some of China's "economic aid" to
Pakistan patently had military uses or implications. Early in the
year it was reported that construction was underway on the last link
of the Chinese-aided Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan with
China. 51 Two months later it was announced that a heavy foundry
and forge completed in 1977 had been commissioned. 52 A few months
after this, China reported on work being done on a sports complex,
which included a stadium that would seat 50,000 people. 53
In August 1980 it was reported that a team of Chinese technical
experts was to arrive soon to finalize the construction of electric
transmissions lines from Tarbela to Mardan and finish a grid station
in the latter city. 54 The cost of this project was put at $21 million;
however, it is uncertain how much of this was Chinese aid, when the
grant was actually made, or what conditions attached were. 55 At
about this same time it was reported that Chinese technicians were
working on the expansion of a cement plant at Daudkhel. 56 No further
details, however, were provided. A protocol on this project was
apparently signed in December, suggesting that the Chinese technicians mentioned above were doing some surveying or conducting a
feasibility study. 57 Mention was also made of a 100 million rupee
($10.1 million) sheet glass plant that was scheduled to go into
production in January 1981, for which China was apparently going to
provide the machinery. 58
During 1980 a Pakistan source summarized China's aid to
Pakistan to date stating that China had provided Pakistan with
military and economic assistance worth $378 million in the form of a
$250 million interest free loan and four grants. 59 This source went on
to say that the above figures did not include any of the cost of the
Karakorum highway and praised both the generosity of Chinese aid

51. International Herald Tribune, February 5, 1979, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle
and Documentation," China Quarterly, 78, (1979): 427.
52. NCNA, April 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April 1979, p. 10.
53. NCNA, October 22, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12.
54. Karachi Radio, August 9, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7.
55. Ibid.
56. Karachi Radio, August 4, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7.
57. Karachi Radio, December 8, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, December 1980, p. 7.
58. Karachi Radio, July 31, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7.
59. Karachi Radio, April 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9.
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and the fact that China had given Pakistan military assistance in
times of need and in an effort to help Pakistan attain self-reliance. 60
On the other hand, almost no mention was made in China of its
assistance, either economic or military, to Pakistan - probably
because the leadership feared some protest about such generosity in
light of China's own poverty which was now being publicly admitted.
Moreover, little was said in Pakistan about China's military aid. This
may explain why there are much higher estimates of China's aid to
Pakistan: military aid may have been excluded from the above
estimate even though it was specifically cited (this is discussed
further below).
In the realm of Chinese military assistance to Pakistan there
were various reports confirming substantial aid, though its value is
difficult to estimate, and it is uncertain how critical that aid was
considering Pakistan's needs. In June, 1979, it was reported that
China had established a string of small military bases or posts along
the 537-mile Karakorum Highway and along the Afghan border to
protect against sabotage. 61 This same source mentioned that there
were up to 3,000 Chinese soldiers in Pakistan. 62 In May a ceremony
was held for a Chinese-aided factory that was said to be "defenseoriented," though further details on the factory were not supplied. 63
Two months later another factory was reported completed. 64 This
factory was part of a complex to rebuild tanks and make spare parts. 65
In November a "heavy rebuild factory" which also manufactures
arms and ammunition and which was built with Chinese aid was
inaugurated. 66 No other details were provided.
During 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979, there were reports of vast Chinese military aid to
Pakistan, though these reports were also contradicted by other
reports of restrictions on Chinese military assistance to Pakistan. In
January shortly after the invasion, Foreign Minister Huang Hua

60. Ibid.
61. Daily Telegraph (London), June 4, 1979, cited in the "Quarterly Chronicle and
Documentation," China Quarterly, 78 (1979): 418.
62. Ibid.
63. NCNA, May 21, 1979, and AFP May 20, 1979, both cited in China Aktuell,
May 1979, p. 12.
64. Karachi Radio, July 8, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, July 1979, p. 8.
65. Ibid.
66. NCNA, November 28, 1979 and Karachi Radio, November 28, 1979, both cited
in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10.
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visited Islamabad and promised to aid Pakistan against a Soviet
threat or Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 67 He said at the time that
China would aid Pakistan in "various ways." 66 This was taken by
foreign analysts to mean that Huang had offered extensive arms aid
to Pakistan. 69 Still another source reported that China to date had
provided Pakistan with a total of $2 billion in military assistance
over a 13-year period and was now rendering even more arms aid to
Pakistan. 70 These reports were offset, however, to some extent by the
fact that President Zia traveled to China in mid-year and reportedly
was promised weapons - but at increased prices and on a cash and
carry basis. 71 This may have reflected the Chinese position that
Pakistan also needed to obtain U.S. arms, indicating some displeasure about Pakistan's negative reaction to a U.S. arms offer at the
time. Alternatively, Pakistan may have asked for more than China
could or perceived it could deliver and for that reason was rebuffed.
Later in the year reports of extensive Chinese military aid to
Pakistan again appeared. According to an Indian source, China had
agreed to provide Pakistan with jet fighters, ground-to-air missiles
and other arms following to an agreement signed earlier in the year. 72
The Indian Defense Ministry subsequently reported that Pakistan
was to receive 65 Fantan jet fighters (an improved design of the MIG
19) and a sizeable number of ground-to-air SAM-2 missiles that
would be placed around Pakistan's nuclear development facilities and
other strategic targets in accordance with a secret agreement made
between the two countries when Pakistan's Air Force chief was in
Beijing in June. 73 Both Pakistan and China, however, denied the
above cited reports. Pakistan also said that statements about Chinese
troops and nuclear rockets in Pakistan were "fabrications by foreign
media."74
Sri Lanka was the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign aid
during the period 1979-80. In August 1979 Prime Minister Premedasa visited Beijing and was offered a 500 million rupee ($32 million)

67. Facts on File, 40, (1980): p. 44.
68. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 270.
69. Kyodo New Service, January 22, 1980, cited in FBIS, January 23, 1980, p. Fl.
70. Mohemmed Aftab, "China Confirms Aid to Pakistan in Face of Threat by
Soviet Union," The Asia Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1980, p. 2.
71. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 218.
72. Asian Wall Street Journal, November 1, 1980, p. 1.
73. Asia Bulletin, December 1980, p. 35.
74. NCNA, November 24, 1980, cited in FBIS, November 26, 1980, p. Fl.
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interest-free loan repayable over a period of 20 years. 75 The loan, hke
most of China's aid donations during the period, was not announced
publicly in China. It was, however, described in Sri Lanka as
designated for three projects: a marketing complex in Columbo, water
supply facilities, and the development of modern villages. 76 Prior to
this agreement, which was one of the biggest Chinese promises to Sri
Lanka in recent years, China had signed a rice-for-rubber deal.
Judging from the fact that a number of earlier such agreements with
Sri Lanka had contained some advantage to Sri Lanka in terms of
prices, and because negotiations were made in the wake of major
cyclone damage to Sri Lanka's rice fields, there was ostensibly some
grant factor in the deal. 77 China also provided hydroelectric units for
four projects under construction in Sri Lanka in 1979, though this
may have constituted aid already promised. 78
During 1980 more Chinese technicians arrived in Sri Lanka,
presumably to work on projects already negotiated and designed. 79
This suggests the immediate working out of details so that the aid
promised in 1979 could be drawn and used. Little else was said about
economic aid in subsequent months, though China also made one
agreement to provide military aid to Sri Lanka. This consisted of the
gift of two "fast gunboats" to the government of Sri Lanka late in the
year to be used for sea surveillance and rescue. 80
According to two different sources China provided loans to the
Burmese government worth either $67 million or $80 million. 81
Neither source cited details or provided documentation and nothing
was said by either government to confirm a large grant of aid during
the year. On the other hand, various other sources confirmed that a
significant amount of aid was given and used, at least during the
latter half of 1979 and early 1980. For example, in August 1979 an
unofficial Burmese source reported that China had provided $7
million worth of equipment for a textile mill project in Burma. 82 Early
75. W.A. Wiswa Warnapala, "Sri Lanka 1979: New Stress in the Economy and·
Polity," Asian Survey 21 (1980): 212.
76. China Aktuell, August 1979, p. 10. No source is cited.
77. Asia Research Bulletin, March 31, 1979, p. 545.
78. Colombo Radio, May 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, June 1979, p. 12.
79. Colombo Radio, February 6, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, February 1980, p. 7.
80. NCNA, December 1, 1980, cited in FBIS, December 2, 1980, p. Fl.
81. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 149 cites the smaller amount; William L. Scully and
Frank N. Trager, "Burma 1979: Reversing the Trend," Asian Survey, 20 (1980): 170-71
cite the larger figure.
82. Radio Rangoon, August 1, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, August 1979, p. 10.
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in 1980 China reported that a rubber ball factory started in 1978 in
Burma had been completed. 83 The factory, it said, would manufacture
50,000 balls per year. 84 In July China announced eight large building
projects under construction in Burma, apparently in fulfillment of the
aid granted in 1979.85
Later in the year, however, there were reports of China again
providing more support for insurgents in Burma and at year's end it
was uncertain whether Burma would still be allowed to draw on
Chinese aid. 86 This was typical of China's past aid relationship with
Burma- an on-and-off again affair.
In Nepal a textile mill was inaugurated in January 1979, built
with Chinese aid at a cost of 180 million rupees. 87 According to
sources in Nepal the mill will employ 400 workers when put into full
operation. 85 A month later a brick factory, started in 1977 and
capable of producing 20 million bricks a year, was completed and
handed over to the Nepal government. 89 And in September an
86-meter long bridge, started in 1979, was completed. 90
In April a Chinese technical team arrived in Nepal to do survey
work for a paper plant. 91 This was apparently a follow-up of aid
promised in 1978. 92 Late in the year an agreement was made on a
paper mill, which was reported to be the first of its kind in Nepal and
said to be capable of producing 10 tons of stationery paper per day. 93
It is uncertain, however, if this was a new agreement or the final
arrangements for a deal made earlier. During 1980 Chinese sources
mentioned other projects under construction, but failed to give any
further information. While there was some delay in road projects
during this period, other evidence indicated that China's aid to Nepal
was both significant and useful and that it would continue - keeping
83. NCNA, May 10, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9.
84. Ibid.
85. NCNA, July 4, 1980, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," The
China Quarterly 84 (1980): p. 815.
86. International Herald Tribune, August 13, 1980, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle
and Documentation," China Quarterly 86 (1980): p. 815.
87. Kathmandu Radio, January 19, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p.

5.
88. Kathmandu Radio, December 30, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979,
p. 5.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

NCNA, February 20, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, February 1979, p. 14.
NCNA, September 21, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, September 1979, p. 12.
Kathmandu Radio, April 5, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April 1979, p. 10.
See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra notes, at 20-21.
NCNA, December 27, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10.
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Nepal from becoming too dependent on India economically or
politically.
In February 1980 China signed an agreement with the government of Bangladesh to supply machinery for a composite textile mill
that will use 2,500 spindles and 250 looms. 94 In August a Chinese
technical team was reported at work on a fertilizer plant for which
China had agreed to provide technical assistance, machinery and
supervisory service. 95 Two agreements were also signed by the two
governments in mid-year when President Ziar Rahman visited
China; according to these agreements China will "provide loans to
Bangladesh.'096 No details, however, were released on these loans
concerning the amount, conditions or time of repayment. Clearly
China wishes to maintain friendly ties with the government of
Bangdalesh and regards a friendly Bangladesh as crucial to, balancing India's influence in South Asia.
According to one source, China promised military aid to Thailand
during 1979;however, no confirmation of this could be made and no
details were provided by that source. 97 In the context of China's aid to
Pol Pot's fo~ces in Kampuchea and the threat of Vietnamese forces on
the Thai-Kampuchean border this report had some credibility. This.
was especially so in mid-1980 when, after Vietnamese forces crossed_
the border into Thailand, China openly promised to help Thailandin
the event of continued incursions or-a prolonged struggle.
In July 1979 China provided an official donation of aid to the
Thai government in the form of a gift of three Chinese-made road_
sweepers. 98 Much more Chinese aid was provided to Thailand,
however, in the form of refugee aid, which has already been cited. In
any event, it was clear that China sought close relations with
Thailand because of the conflicts in Kampuchea and Laos in view of
China's support of the insurgency movements there. China also
sought to support Bangkok's position on not recognizing the Heng
Samrin government in Kampuchea.

Aid to African Nations
During 1979 China granted or delivered aid to 23 African
countries; during 1980 twenty-five African nations, received Chinese
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Dacca Radio, March 1, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, March 1980, p. 27.
Dacca Radio, August 21, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7.
NCNA, July 24, 1980, cited in FBIS, July 25, 1980, p. 13.
"Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, 90 (1989): 899.
NCNA, July 21, 1979, cited in FBIS, August 3, 1979, p. Al.
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assistance (See Tables 13 & 14). Unlike aid given insurgency
movements and to non-Communist Asian countries, most of China's
help to African countries was in small amounts and much was in the
form of medical teams and agricultural projects. Several African
countries also received emergency assistance and two or three got
arms aid. Compared to the recent past Beijing was clearly less
interested in financing large, expensive projects in Africa ostensibly
due to the need for capital to finance its own development. Following
nearly a decade-long trend Chinese decision makers continued to
avoid competition with Western aid and devoted most of their efforts
to countering Soviet influence in Africa. In fact, it seemed more and
more true that China's aid efforts were aimed at following the lead of
the U.S. and other Western countries in terms of dealing with Soviet
influence.
During 1980 the only nations to receive aid from China where
the amount was cited were in Africa - Kenya, Zimbabwe, and
Tanzania and Zambia for the Tanzam Railroad. In the case of the
grant to Kenya - China's largest in the area during the two year
period - there was some hint of a shift of interest from Tanzania to
Kenya as China's favorite in Africa. Aid to Zimbabwe represents an
extension of help that China granted to Robert Mugabe during the
civil war and an effort to assist him after coming to power, having an
edge over the Soviet Union in terms of his friendship. Aid to
Tanzania and Zambia represents an effort by China to maintain its
largest aid project ever and probably can be seen as a move to ensure
that the project does not fall into disuse and result in a loss of face for
China's foreign aid program.
In September 1980 Kenya's President visited China and at the
time was granted a $50 million interest-free loan to be drawn in the
next ten years and to be used in the areas of rice growing and the
development of geothermal projects. 99 The size of this loan and the
fact that Vice-Premier Ji Pengfei had visited Kenya in August, while
neglecting to visit Tanzania on this trip, prompted some speculation
that China was shifting its emphasis in Africa to Kenya in order to
build a strategic anti-Soviet coalition there. 100 Since the United States
had been offered basing rights in Kenya in the wake of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan it may also be seen to represent China's
99. Nairobi Radio, September 20, 1980, cited in African Report, NovemberDecember 1980, p. 31.
100. See "Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly 84 (1980): 815-16.
101. Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 31 citing both Africa Research
Bulletin, September 30, 1980 and Nairobi Radio, September 20, 1980.
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willingness to follow the U.S. lead in Africa in countering Soviet
influence. Beijing may likewise have been motivated in making this
loan by the fact that it had already invested considerable aid funds in
a multimillion dollar sports complex near Nairobi where the
All-Africa Games will be held in 1982. 101 Clearly China will gain
considerable publicity for its aid at that time.
China's second largest aid donation in Africa during the period
under study and the only aid donation to be announced publically in
China was a $26.7 million interest-free loan to Zimbabwe in
September 1980. 102 This loan was made in Chinese currency and with
provision that it be drawn over the next five years. 103 China's decision
to make this donation related to China's long friendship with Robert
Mugabe and its support for him and his guerrilla movement, ZANU,
for a number of years. 104 On the other hand it was reported that the
Soviet Union during 1979 became a major arms suppliers to
Zimbabwe; in fact, such supplies were equal to China's. Thus,
Beijing's aid may have been an effort to counter Soviet
enchroachments. 105
The only other announced aid donation of any size was a $12.8
million grant to Tanzania and Zambia to buy spare parts for the
trains running on the Tanzam Railroad. 106 Beijing may have also
separately agreed to repair embankments on the railroad in Tanzania
and bridges blown up in Zambia during the Rhodesian Civil war. 107 If
this is true, the above cited figure underrepresents China's aid to the
Tanzam Railroad during this period.
The railroad, completed in 1976, was China's largest aid project
anywhere and guaranteed China a base of operations in East
Africa. 108 However, building the line mainly for political rather than
economic reasons and thus ignoring cost factors, the opening of
competing transportation links for the shipment of Zambia's copper to
port, conflict in the region, and frequent breakdowns of the Chinese102. NCNA, September 14, 1980, cited in FBIS, September 16, 1980, p. El.
103. Ibid.
104. See author's other works on China's foreign aid for details on previous aid to
Mugabe and ZANU. It is noteworthy that China has provided weapons and supplies for
several thousand guerrillas under Mugabe's leadership in recent years.
105. See New York Times, June 3, 1979, p. IV 3.
106. International Herald Tribune, September 2, 1980, cited in "Chronicle and
Documentation," China Quarterly.
107. See Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 34, which cites several other
sources.
108. See Copper, CmNA's FoREIGN Am, pp. 103-08.
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designed diesel locomotives have all caused the line to accumulate a
large debt - in the range of $26 million by 1980. 109 In providing the
above cited aid China appeared to want to bail out the rail line and
prevent the loss of prestige that might result from the line not being
used or from the purchase of replacement locomotives elsewhere. 110
China continued to provide military aid to a number of African
countries during 1979-80. As noted earlier an estimated 500 Chinese
military advisors were in the region during the period. On the other
hand, little was said or written about China's arms aid to African
nations, probably because Beijing wanted to kt=lep a low profile so as
to legitimately portray the Soviet Union as the arms purveyor to the
region. Also, since Moscow can provide more and better weapons than
China and frequently delivers weapons to nations at odds with
nations being helped by China or uses Chinese aid as an excuse for
sending military hardware, African nations are hesitant to say
anything about obtaining Chinese military assistance.
Nevertheless, in early 1979 the President of Somalia stated that
China was giving his country arms as well as other aid.m No details,
however, were given by Somalia's president. Zaire was also reportedly receiving Chinese military aid, though again no details were made
available. 112
In addition to its official aid and military assistance given during
the period 1979-80, China rendered considerable help to a sizeable
number of African countries in the form of project aid, agricultural
assistance and medical aid. Project aid was the most expensive for
China and gave China more visibility in Africa than elsewhere.
Agricultural assistance and medical aid, however, gave Beijing a
greater physical presence in African countries, certainly relatively to
their cost. In all of these areas China had already proven its
capabilities. And its aid projects have been and will no doubt
continue to'be finished as designed and will be useful to the recipient
nation. On the other hand, during the period China cut the number of
large projects undertaken, probably for a combination of two reasons:
they are too costly when seen against China's own needs for
development capital at home, and they have not been as successful as
smaller projects (witness the Tanzam Railroad). This, however,
109. Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 34.
110. West German-made locomotives were being considered for replacements for
the Chinese-made locomotive. See ibid.
111. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves 25 (1979): 29877.
112. Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 33.

24

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

should not be taken as evidence that China is ending or will in the
near future terminate its foreign aid program. China's foreign aid
giving clearly serves a purpose, and it has witnessed a number of
rises and declines in the past.
In the area of project aid, five to ten new major projects were
agreed upon each year during the period and about the same number
were under construction or completed. (See Tables 15 and 16). This is
a marked decrease in the number of projects promised or started in
the past several years, especially when compared to the more than
twenty projects negotiated or put under construction in 1978. 113 The
most popular kinds of projects were road and bridge construction,
public buildings and dams and other water projects. China also
announced starting work on a textile mill and a farm implements
factory. This generally follows past preferences and reflects a policy
of negotiating the kinds of projects China has been best at in the past.
Cape Verde, Mali, Mauritius, Upper Volta and Zambia were the
most important recipients of new project aid during 1979. Burundi,
Madagascar, Mauritainia, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tanzania were
the major benefactors of new projects in 1980. This list reflects a
rather even distribution between East and West Africa and between
large and small nations.
Agricultural aid ranked second in terms of costs as a category of
aid projects. Details were available on a half a dozen projects started
or finished during each of the two years under consideration. (See
Tables 17 and 18). The fact that a larger number of projects was
completed than started seems to suggest that China may be
considering phasing out its agricultural aid projects. On the other
hand this probably reflects more the fact that China has cut, and is
still in the process of cutting, its aid program. Moreover, China has
started giving sizeable amounts of famine relief and related kinds of
aid through the United Nations and other global organizations, and
is now giving less publicity to its aid giving. Undoubtedly, some
projects have gone unreported.
Jn contrast to its project and agricultural aid during 1979-80
China's medical assistance showed an increase. A slightly larger
number of medical teams - 13 in 1979 and 8 in 1980 - were sent to
African countries than in past years. (See Tables 19 and 20). This
may reflect a perceived need by Chinese leaders for a greater
presence in Africa; but it may also be an effort to cut expenses in aid

113. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5.
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giving since medical aid is much less expensive than other kinds of
aid.
China's medical aid teams sent during 1979-80, as in past years,
generally consisted of five to twenty people trained as paramedics.
Only in the case of Algeria was a large medical team sent, and only
in the case of Tanzania were doctors specifically noted among the
medical personnel. Finally, only in the case of the Congo was there
medical equipment or medicine in any significant value given, except
in the case of the hospitals completed in Mauritania and Sierra
Leone.
In the case of China's aid to African nations, probably more of
China's assistance went unreported during the period than elsewhere
because of its unwillingness to document its aid giving, plus the fact
that smaller donations were not cited in other sources. In addition,
Chinese aid to African nations is less novel and interesting than it
has been in past years and is now regarded by only a few observers as
a threat to Western interests. Thus a number of aid promises made to
African nations in the past few years where follow-up information
was unavailable probably suggests that they have simply not been
reported. Some may have been delayed, but because of China's
reputation in the aid field in Africa and its concern about perserving
its leadership role among Third World countries, probably few have
been cancelled.

Aid to Nations in Other Regions
China's foreign assistance during 1979-80 to nations other than
in the two geographic regions already discussed consisted primarily
of aid to nations in Northern Africa and the Middle East. (See Tables
21 and 22.) China gave the most aid to Egypt, primarily in the form
of military aid. In the case of several other Middle Eastern countries
China's foreign aid program was in the process of being transformed
into construction and other aid-type projects for profit. As in the case
of its cutting back on its aid giving, this is explained by China's need
for investment capital, especially foreign exchange, and the fact that
a number of Middle Eastern countries have vast quantities of oil
money or are helped by those that do.
Elsewhere, China's aid giving during the period reflected no new
interests of importance, with Malta and Guyana the only recipients
in Europe or Latin America, other than recipients of emergency aid.
This seemed to reflect the fact that Chinese leaders perceive their
capabilities as limited and have little or no desire to expand their aid
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giving into new regions, especially where they have little or no hope
of competing with the Soviet Union. Although Latin American
countries are receptive to China's aid, Beijing apparently views the
region as one where only the United States can stave off Soviet
intrusions, while it, China, can do very little to help. On the other
hand, Beijing did provide some emergency aid to Jamaica and the
Dominican Republic as noted in the introduction. It also granted
emergency aid to Fiji for the first time and with that donation set a
precedent in helping a nation in that part of the world.
In June 1979 Egypt's President Sadat in a public address made
reference to Chinese military assistance. Subsequently he elaborated
upon his statement saying that Egypt had received forty Shenyang
F-6 jet fighters (Chinese version of the MiG-19), noting that four were
already in service. 114 He also revealed that negotiations were in
progress for forty or fifty more and that Egypt in return had given
China a Soviet MiG-23, which China had been anxious to obtain to
facilitate its aircraft manufacturing capabilities. 115 Whether this
transaction consisted of a loan or a gift on China's part is uncertain.
Its value is also difficult to estimate. Another source noted that Egypt
planned to use the Chinese aircraft at an air base south of Cairo to
allow its MiG-21 fleet to be deployed closer to the Libyan border. 116
Still another source mentioned that at least part of the aircraft would
be used for training purposes. 117
In any case, the deal was made in the context of tensions between
Egypt and Libya and the conclusion of the Camp David agreements,
which was followed by a partial cutoff of military aid by important
Arab suppliers. In this transaction China sought to help Egypt
diversify its arms sources and to gain some leverage or influence over
the situation in the Middle East. Chinese leaders probably perceived
that the accords reached between Egypt and Israel provided some
hope of stability in the area - to the disadvantage of the Soviet
Union, thereby hampering the Kremlin's efforts to expand its naval
presence into the Indian Ocean and on to Southeast Asia. The
Chinese delivery of military aid to Egypt may also be seen as related

114. Kessings Contemporary Archives, 25 (1979): 29953.
115. Ibid.
116. See Financial Times, June 21 and 23, 1979 and Guardian, June 6, 1979, cited
in Africa Report, September-October 1979, p. 35.
117. John R. W. Taylor (ed.), Janes All the World's Aircraft, 1980-81 (London:
Janes Publishing Co., 1981), p. 33.
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to improving U.S.-China relations and as an effort on the part of
Chinese leaders to support U.S. policy in the Middle East.
In addition to military assistance China also provided Egypt with
economic aid in the form of technical help in building a fish farm
complex of more than seventy separate nurseries that also raise
ducks and fruit trees. 118 The project, which was started in 1979 and is
due to be completed in 1982, is being built by a private company with
local investors - representing one of the few known cases where
China has provided assistance to a private enterprise. On the other
hand no details were provided on the size or scope of Chinese help,
which may or may not have been very significant.
The next most important country in terms of the amount of aid
received from China was North Yemen. Here, however, a sizeable
portion of China's projects were paid for, thereby not constituting aid.
There were a number of projects undertaken, some in each category
and some undesignated or uncertain. In May 1979 Chinese sources
mentioned technicians at work on a forty-eight kilometer long road in
North Yemen that was started in 1974. 119 Since this was originally an
aid project it seems unlikely that it was renegotiated into a project for
which China was to receive payment. At about the same time
mention was also made of a foundation laying ceremony for an
oil-pressing plant to be built with Chinese aid. 120 However, no details
were provided regarding the conditions of financing or repayment.
At nearly the same time a Chinese survey team arrived in North
Yemen to do preliminary surveying and other work for an international conference building that was to be built by China at North
Yemen's expense. 121 A few months later, in August 1979, it was
reported that the China Road and Bridge Construction Company had
signed four contracts with the government of North Yemen - two to
build an airport and heliport and two for roads- involving a total
cost of $10 million. 122 Since the announcement, which came from an
official Chinese source, used the word contract it must be assumed
that North Yemen paid for this project also.
Two agreements were made, one in May and another in
December 1979 that may or may not consist of Chinese aid. In May a
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
p. 10.

NCNA,
NCNA,
NCNA,
NCNA,
NCNA,

December 7, 1989, cited in China Aktuell, December 1980, p. 7.
May 4, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, May 1979, p. 12.
May 20, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1979, p. 12.
March 19, 1979, cited in FBIS, March 23, 1979, p. F2.
August (no date indicated), 1979, cited in China Aktuell, August 1979,
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ceremony was held on the starting of a cement plant, but insufficient
details were provided to determine if it was an aid project or not. 123 In
December an agreement was reached on the expansion of a textile
mill, but again sufficient details were lacking to determine the
nature of the agreement. 124
In early 1980 China sent fifty-one medical workers to North
Yemen to work in a general hospital, according to a protocol
agreement signed at the time which stated that they would be paid
for their services. 126 In addition to these medical workers China also
dispatched eleven agrotechnicians and twenty-seven textile technicians, all under contract - presumably meaning that they were to be
paid. 126 In June the official news agency in China reported that the
China Construction Engineering Corporation and the China Road
and Bridge Engineering Company had signed more than twenty
contracts with the government of North Yemen. 127 In July and again
in December 1980 mention was made of a radio and television
building and a housing cooperative built by Chinese engineers and
workers in North Yemen, apparently according to agreements signed
earlier. 126 All of these projects were apparently paid for by North
Yemen.
In August the foundation was laid for a Chinese aided canal
project in Tunisia that, according to details released on the project,
will be 123 kilometers in length and constitutes the main part of the
nation's water conservancy plan in the northern part of the country
and will help irrigate 20,000 hectares of farmland. 129 This project was
negotiated in 1978 and was projected to cost $17 million, of which
China was to provide $8 million. 130 In terms of China's foreign policy
objectives the project represents an effort to maintain close ties with
a friendly nation in the Middle East.
In November 1979 a sports complex built with Chinese economic
assistance was completed in Syria. 131 This project was also negotiated
in 1978, though details concerning its cost and conditions of the
123. NCNA, May 4, 1979, cited in FBIS, May 17, 1979, p. 14.
124. NCNA, December 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979 p. 10.
125. NCNA, January 29, 1980, cited in FBIS January 30, 1980, p. 12.
126. Ibid.
127. NCNA, June 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, June 1980, p. 9.
128. NCNA, July 10, 1980 cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 9; NCNA,
December 16, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, December 1980, p. 7.
129. NCNA, August 15, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, August 1979, p. 10.
130. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5, at 39-40.
131. NCNA, November 16, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, November 1979, p. 11.
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agreement were revealed neither at the time the agreement was
negotiated nor at the time of completion of the project. 132
In South Yemen in July 1979 a Chinese technical group left the
country after helping in the operations of a salt works - a project
completed with Chinese aid in 1976. 133 In December a state-owned
fishery built with Chinese aid was handed over to the government,
including an ice house, repair shops, offices and storehouses that
were part of the project. 134 In June 1980 work began on a Chineseaided highway project 203 kilometers in length which would link up
to another Chinese-built highway, all part of a major highway
network. 135 In view of increasingly closer Soviet-South Yemen
relations it appeared in 1979 that Chinese aid operations consisted of
merely closing shop; however, the starting of a new project in 1980
seems to suggest something quite different. Chinese leaders appeared
to perceive that a presence in South Yemen was still worthwhile or
that they might have some chance of maintaining good relations with
the government of South Yemen despite the Soviet presence.
In Iraq in mid-1980 a bridge built with Chinese aid (completed in
1979) was opened to traffic, while Chinese technicians completed the
approaches. 136 China desired a presence in Iraq to help counter the
influence ofthe Soviet Union there, but in view of China's tilt toward
Iran in the conflict between Iran and Iraq it appears that Chinese aid
to Iraq probably came to an end in 1980.
The only other Middle Eastern country to receive Chinese aid
during 1979-80 was the Sudan. In July 1979 it was announced that a
Chinese-aid fishery project there had opened. 137 No other details were
provided. A Chinese medical team was also sent to Sudan in 1979. 138
Considering the level of Chinese aid activity in the Sudan in 1978,
1979-80 shows a severe cutting back - though no reason can be
suggested other than the fact that China simply had less money and
resources to devote to its foreign aid program during the period.
Elsewhere, China continued a major aid project in Malta started
several years ago: a large dry dock faciliiy capable of repairing
300,000-ton ~~ips. In July 1979 it was reported that construction was

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5, at 40.
NCNA, July 1, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 19, 1979, p. 13.
Ibid.
NCNA, June 23, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, June 1980, p. 0.
NCNA, July 19, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 9.
NCNA, July 26, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 27, 1979, p. 16.
NCNA, January 6, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5.
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proceeding apace and that the facility would be finished in a year. 139
In late 1980 it was revealed that China had signed an agreement on
the construction of a breakwater, suggesting that the dry dock had
been or was near completion - though there was no announcement
to that effect. 140
As in the case of non-communist Europe, there was only one
Latin American nation to receive foreign aid from China during
1979-80: Guyana. In February 1980 the official Chinese news agency
reported that a textile mill was under construction in Guyana using
Chinese foreign aid, and later in the year reported that the mill,
using 15,000 spindles and over 400 looms, had been completed. 141 This
project was started in 1976 and had received frequent praise from the
Guyana government.

Conclusions
China's foreign aid giving during 1979-80 reflects some new
directions in Chinese foreign policy as well as some continuations of
old trends. In both realms a number of specifics are worth mentioning.
In terms of its size and scope China's foreign aid program declined, though perhaps not as much as might have been expected considering Chi~a's _policy priorities. The big drop had already been
experienced in 1977 and 1978 when China decreased and finally cut
completely its aid to its two largest recipients - Vietnam and
Albania. The period under study saw no evidence of any plan to
reverse this decision; in fact, China was more hostile than ever
toward Vietnam and the Chinese invasion of the northern part of
Vietnam and continued tension and even fighting on the border after
the spring of 1979 may in a sense be seen as an effort to take its aid
back, or at least to cost Vietnam for its ungratefulness for past
Chinese largess. In the case of Albania, Beijing seemed simply to
have no interest in putting relations back on track. Thus, in contrast
to its past pattern of aid giving, little aid was given to communist
bloc nations during 1979-80. However, this does not represent an
abandoning of its interests in the bloc; rather it represents political
realities and greater opportunities elsewhere. China continued to
139. NCNA, November 20, 1980, cited in FBIS, November 21, 1980, p. Gl.
140. NCNA, November 20, 1980, cited in FBIS, November 21, 1980, p. G2.
141. NCNA, February 20, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, February 1980, p. 7; NCNA,
May 28, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9.
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compete with the Kremlin for leadership of communist nations in
various other ways.
There was also a significant decline in China's willingness to
provide economic help to other countries because of the high priority
on it, own economic dPvelopment. Chinese leaders saw greater needs
at home and felt less generous abroad. Some of China's new leaders
no doubt saw China's aid program, at least the broad and costly
program built by Mao, as unnecessary and not worthwhile. On the
other hand there was no officially voiced opposition to China's aid
program during the two year period, in contrast to some criticism of
China's aid giving in 1978. In short, it seems that the problem was
more one of finding support or enthusiasm for aid giving among
Chinese decision makers when the focus of attention was on China's
own development.
Thus, there were no new nations added to Chinese list of aid
recipients - except for two or three that received emergency
assistance for the first time. Similarily, the number of loans made
and projects promised declined significantly. Finally, Beijing showed
no interest in any new big projects.
This, however, should not be seen as reflecting a decision to
continue to reduce the foreign aid program or to scrap it piecemeal.
The number of recipients of Chinese assistance increased in 1978
(though the amount decreased because of dropping aid to Vietnam
and Albania); thus it was not unusual for the number of benefactors
to decrease during 1979-80. China's aid giving has experienced
rather marked cycles of rises and declines in the past. Moreover, past
experience shows that China's decisions to give aid depend primarily
upon threats or perceived threats to its security and its relations with
the superpowers.
·
Nevertheless, it can probably be argued that China has decided
against giving huge amounts of aid to nations that might become
client states. It turned out to be a failure in the cases of Vietnam and
Albania; both turned against Chin& when they found it expedient or
had other reasons to do so. In the case of Tanzania and Zambia where
China undertook its largest aid project ever in the mid-1970s- the
Tanzam Railroad - and where it also delivered large amounts of
project and arms aid, Chinese leaders discovered that the recipients'
appetite for aid was much larger than they had guessed and that
their receiving aid from Western countries did not really contradict
China's objectives in the area. China has apparently also given up
supporting other countries financially to the point of their becoming
dependent upon Chinese economic help.
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Another change in China's aid policy is that of giving greater
attention to economic feasibility in aid projects. Beijing has ostensibly learned a lesson in the case of the Tanzam Railroad: if you are
going to build a project that is not economically feasible, it requires
r.ontinued financial support and can become both ::Jn t>r.onomic bnrcien
and a costly investment in terms of prestige. Thus Chinese decision
makers during 1979-80 gave more attention to whether projects could
be finished as designed and whether they would be self-sustaining.
Hence there was a preference for smaller projects and the types of
projects China already has considerable experience in buildings.
Similarly, China reflected even less concern then in the pastthough this was never a central motive for China's aid programs about fostering socialist economic systems. Aid has as a rule been
given on a government to government basis; but its use after that has
not been of too much concern to Chinese leaders. During the period
under study China probably for the first time - at least the first time
where it got widespread attention- rendered aid to a private project.
And this may be seen as something other than an isolated case:
China seemed to be interested in investing abroad for profit or to gain
the same kind of influence in the recipient nation that Western
capitalist investment provides.
It is worth repeating that China has also transformed some of its
aid projects into projects that render a profit. In this way China has
realized profit from its aid program, namely from the experience
abroad it has provided and expertise in various kinds of construction.
It seems likely that in the near future China will be competing with
South Korea, Taiwan and a number of other countries that have
made significant profits from overseas construction work.
Following a previous trend of at least a decade China continued
to compete very little with Western aid programs and aid giving. The
only area where China may be judged to have competed with Western
countries during the period was in southern Africa and even here it
was not very direct (if at all meaningful competition) and seemed,
considering trends and China's policy in the region as a whole, to
reflect a convergence of aims, rather than growing competition. This
was most noticably true in the case of China's aid to the government
of Zimbabwe.
An examination of China's aid strategy in different regions
suggests that, whereas there were different tactics and varying
applications of aid, its basis strategy remained intact: to reduce the
influence of the Soviet Union abroad. In Southeast Asia China used
its aid to sustain guerrilla movements opposed to the Soviet Union
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and Vietnam (viewed by the Chinese as a Soviet protege in the
region). Here China may be seen in fact to have resurrected the
Maoist concept of supporting "wars of national liberation"- but this
time against communist regimes supported by Hanoi and Moscow
instead of governments supported by "Western imperialism." In
South Asia China continued to seek to maintain a balance of power
on the subcontinent to limit India's influence, but this must also be
seen in the context of India's alliance and close ties with the Soviet
Union. During 1980 Beijing became even more concerned about the
region because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Africa
China's focus remained on Soviet penetration and the Kremlin's
search for bases whereby it could expand its military influence,
particularily its naval power, to the Indain Ocean and on. In the
Middle East, China continued to try to exploit, on a case by case
basis, Soviet problems in the region. Elsewhere in the world there
was little or no change: China continued to realize its limitations.
This cannot be translated as China abondoning its efforts to lead
Third World nations. In fact, leadership of the Third World should
still be seen as an important Chinese foreign policy goal. On the
other hand, Chinese leaders more than in the past realize their limits
in giving aid and the little promise trade with other developing
countries has to offer. Beijing has apparently also taken cognizance of
the fact that there is a significant interdependence between Third
World countries (including China itself) and the West, and that
confrontation is not something China can exploit to its own
advantage, particularily in the context of its own development efforts.
In this sense, China has clearly become a more status quo-oriented
nation.
China has shifted what should be regarded as a fairly significant
amount of its aid funds to delivery through the U.N. and other
international organizations, whereas in the past China's foreign aid
was exclusively bilateral. This can be seen as a new approach to
China's leadership of the Third World. It may also offset some fears
among poorer countries that China will take a giant portion of the
funds available from global lending institutions. Finally it mirrors a
greater interest in China's part in becoming a legitimate member of
the global community and in using its international influence against
its arch-enemy the Soviet Union.
During 1979-80 China gave more military assistance to noncommunist nations than in the past. However, it is too early to judge
whether this represents a change in policy or even a trend. The needs
and the opportunities were there; China responded. China's arms aid
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during the period should thus be viewed on a case by case basis. And
while China's military aid mcreased, it is still small by Soviet or
Western standards- and this is unlikely to change. As in the case of
economic assistance, China needs arms at home: its arms industry
has not grown appreciably, while its own needs, or at least perceived
needs, have increased. In short, Chinese leaders probably see
selective arms aid as a most effective way of countering global Soviet
expansion and it will continue to be an attractive alternative, but
only on a situation or opportunity basis.
China's aid during the period continued to be generous, or at
least that is the way it would generally be assessed. Most aid was in
the form of non-interest loans with liberal terms of repayment. Also,
as a developing country, China has to be seen as charitable merely
for having a foreign aid program. On the other hand Beijing
continues to ask for repayment in goods and services, thereby
offsetting the inflation factor which constitutes a large grant aspect
in most Western aid that is repayable in currency rather than goods.
And, Chinese aid remains tied to Chinese products, the choices were
limited and, in many cases, the quality was lower or inconsistent.
Recipient nations, however, still find Chinese aid useful - valued
generally for the utility of the projects and the specific needs they
fill. On the other hand it no longer evokes an aid giving response by
Western nations to counter Chinese influence. This was particularly
evident during 1979-80.
In concluding, it is necessary to say something about the future
of China's foreign aid program based upon the two-year period
assessed here. The years 1979-80 showed a decline in China's aid
giving and there is no reason to believe judging from its aid program
or other information that it will increase appreciably once again in
the next few years. Yet there is little cause to conclude that China is
phasing out its aid giving. Aid will doubtless continue to be an
important instrument of China's foreign policy, though Beijing will
probably in coming years use economic assistance more as a means of
influence in and through the U.N. Here Chinese leaders will
doubtless experience some of the problems other nations have in this
effort: the inefficiency of U.N. and other global aid giving institutions, loss of donor recognition, and the inability to control the use of
its aid. Because of this China is likely to also maintain a bilateral
foreign aid program, though judging from the last two years it will
probably be one consisting of smaller projects and types of aid in
which China has experience, with continued emphasis on construction, agricultural and medical aid and emergency assistance. Military
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aid will probably continue to be important and may even be increased
as long as Sino-Soviet relations remain in their present state.
The fact that Chinese leaders still find aid giving an easy means
of gaining some leverage over events and political decisions in other
countries makes it important. Similarly, it is a source of good global
publicity - which because of China's new role in the U.N. as a
legitimate member of the global community, is now more important
than ever. Finally, nothing seems to have changed in that Chinese
leaders still need to project an image of morality, if not charity and
generosity to the rest of the world.
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TABLE 1

China's Official Aid Promises by Year
(US$ millions)

Year

Amount

Pre-1953
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

75
394.9
12.5
378
112.7
15.8
125.6
135.35
298.2
447.2
0

87
344.9
124.7
10.5
437.8a
56.5
10
1,124.3b
421.7
922.5
430
282
110
140c
119.7 - 129.7d
121 - 177e
99 - 112
89.5

Number of
Recipients
1
2
1

2
6

1
8
6
7
8
0

3

14
5
2
6
3
1
8

14
15
13
7
5
5
3
6
2
4

• This included $400 million promised for the Tan-Zam Railroad.
This included $300 million in aid to Romania which was officially promised, but
the amount was not disclosed. The $300 million figure is an estimate.
< This includes $47 million which was a cost overrun on the Tan-Zam Railroad. It
also includes an estimated $50 million in new aid to Egypt, announced without exact
figures. It does not include $47 million to Chile which was a renegotiated loan
originally promised to the Allende regime.
d This includes a $52 million loan to Pakistan and a $52 to $62 million loan to
Chile which may have been promised in previous years but was not renewed in 1977.
• This includes a $56 million loan to Mozambique that was renegotiated in 1978.
r Tanzania and Zambia together received a grant for the Tan-Zam Rail:-oad.
b
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TABLE 2
China's Officially Announced Aid in 1979
Recipient

Amount

Purpose/Comments

Burma

$67 to $80 million*

Loan or loans for various
projects

Sri Lanka

Rs 500 million
($32 million)

Interest free loan various
projects, repayable in 20
years.

*

Two sources give different figures on the amount of China's aid to Burma.

TABLE 3
China's Officially Announced Aid in 1980
Recipient

Amount

Purpose/Comment

Kenya

$50 million

Interest-free loan payable
over 10-year period for
rice growing and the development of geothermal
projects

Zimbabwe

40 million rmb
($26. 7 million)

Interest-free loan for five
years

Tanzania and
Zambia

5.78 million pounds
($12.83 million)

Loan for spare parts for
Tan-Zam Railroad
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Table 4
China's Aid Recipients in 1979 by Region or Bloc
Africa

Communist Bloc

Benin
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Madagascar
Malagasy Republic
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Niger
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Upper Volta
Zaire
Zambia

Afghanistan*
Yugoslavia
Vietnam**

Non-Communist Asia
Burma
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Thailand

Other
Dominican Republic
Fiji
Jamaica
Malta

North Africa and Middle East
Egypt
Morocco
North Yemen
South Yemen
Syria
Tunisia

* China finished an aid project in Afghanistan after a communist government
was installed there.
** China claimed it gave food and medical assistance to Vietnamese in o·ccupied
areas after China's invasion in early 1979.
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TABLE 5
China's Aid Recipients in 1980 by Region or Bloc
Africa

Communist Bloc

Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Madagascar
Malagasy Republic
Mali
Mauritius

North Korea

Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

North Africa and Middle East
Algeria
Egypt
Iraq
Morocco
North Yemen
South Yemen

Non-Communist Asia
Bangladesh
Burma
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Thailand

Other
Guyana
Malta
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TABLE 6
Chinese Disaster or Emergency Aid in 1979

Recipient

Amount of Aid and Purpose

Dominican Republic

10,000 rmb ($6, 700) to aid hurricane
victims1

Fiji

5,000 rmb ($3,300) to help cyclone
victims2

Jamaica

10,000 rmb ($6,700) to aid flood
victims3

Mauritius

20,000 rupees ($2,635) to help cyclone
victims•

Thailand

200,000 rmb ($133,000) to aid in refugee reliefS

Yugoslavia

300,000 rmb ($200,000) to aid earthquake victims6

Sources: 1. NCNA September 13, 1979, cited in FBIS September 23, 1979, p. J-1. 2.
NCNA April 10, 1979, cited in FBIS April 11, 1979 p. E-1. 3. NCNA June
19, 1979, cited in FBIS June 20, 1979, p. J-3. 4. NCNA, April 5, 1979, cited
in FBIS AprillO, 1979, p. 1-5. 5. NCNA, July 20, 1979, cited in FBIS, July
27, 1979, p. E-9. 6. NCNA April 22, 1979, cited in FBIS April 24, 1979, p.
H-1.
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TABLE 7
China's Disaster or Emergency Aid in 1980
Recipient

Amount

Purpose/Comments

Iran

200,000 rmb 1
($133,000)

Given in blankets and
tents to aid flood victims in north Iran

Mauritius

10,000 rmb 2
($6,670)

To aid flood victims

Pakistan

300,000 rmb3
($200,000)

Food, blankets and
medicine given to help
Mghan refugees

Somalia

300 tons of rice and
other food•

Given to help refugees

Thailand

500,000 rmb5
($333,000)

200,000 rmb given in
canned food and
300,000 rmb in rice for
Kampuchean refugees

Thailand

500,000 rmb6
($333,000)

Same as above

Sources:

1. NCNA, February 25, 1980, cited in FBIS, February 26, 1980, p. 11. 2.
NCNA, January 19, 1980, cited in FBIS, January 23, 1980, p. Fl. 3. NCNA,
February 18, 1980, cited in FBIS, February 20, 1980, p. Al. 4. NCNA,
August 30, 1980, cited in FBIS, September 3, 1980, p. 11. 5. NCNA, August
30, 1980, cited in FBIS August 30, 1980. 6~ NCNA, June 10, 1980, cited in
FBIS, June 11, 1980, p. 13.
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TABLE 8

China's Aid to the United Nations and U.N.
Affiliate Organizations in 1980
Recipient

Amount

Purpose/Comments

U.N. Common Fund

$2 million 1

To help stabilize commodity prices

U.N. Conference on
Aiding Kampuchean
People

$1.17 million 2

Relief supplies for Kampuchean people

Food and Agricultural
Organization

$100,0003

To help famine stricken
people in Africa

Food and Agricultural
Organization

$300,000

To support Conference on
Agrarian Reform and Rural Development

Food and Agricultural
Organization

$200,000

To support seed improvement

U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees

$300,0004

To help Afghan refugees
in Pakistan

U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees

$400,0005

U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees

$300,0006

Follow-up on World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development

U.N. Interim Fund for
Science and Technology

$400,000 rmb 7
($267,000)

Part to be paid in U.S.
dollars

U.N. Trust Fund for
Namibia

$20,0008

In celebration of International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
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U.N. Trust Fund for
South Africa

$300,0009

World Food Program

$400,000 10

Sources:
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In celebration of International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

1. NCNA, June 17, 1980, cited in FBIS, June 18, 1980, p. A5. 2. "Quarterly
Chronicle and Documentation," The China Quarterly 83 11980): 631. 3.
Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" The China Quarterly 82 (1980):
388. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. NCNA, March 20, 1980, cited in FBIS,
March 21, 1980, p. Al. 9. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," The
China Quarterly 82 (1980): 388. 10. Ibid.

TABLE 9

China's Aid to Insurgency Groups or Revolutionary
Movements During 1979
Recipient

Kind and/or Amount of Aid

Burmese Communist
Party

Medicine and supplies

Khmer Rouge

Large quantities of weapons, supplies,
medicine, food and even advisors

Laotian Rebel Forces

Military training, arms, supplies,
salaries

Rhodesian guerrilla
forces led by Robert
Mugabe

Arms and advisors

SWAPO

Unknown quantity of military aid
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TABLE 10
China's Aid to Insurgency Groups or Revolutionary
Movements During 1980
Recipient

Kind and/or Amount of Aid

Burmese Communist
Party

Arms, equipments, training and
medical supplies

Khmer Rouge

Large quantities of small arms, supplies, equipment, medicine and probably food

Rebel forces in Afghanistan

Small arms

Rebel forces in Laos

Military training, weapons and supplies

TABLE 11
China's Aid to Non-communist Nations During 1979
Burma
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Thailand

TABLE 12
China's Aid To Non-communist Nations During 1980
Bangladesh
Burma
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Thailand
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TABLE 13
China's Aid to African Nations During 1979
Benin
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Madagascar
Malagasy Republic
Mali

Mauritania
Mauritius
Niger
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Upper Volta
Zaire
Zambia

TABLE 14
China's Aid to African Nations During 1980
Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissea
Madagascar
Malagasy Republic
Mali
Mauritius

Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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TABLE 15
China's Project Aid to African Countries in 1979
(excluding agricultural projects)

Recipient

Kind of Project

Comments

Cameroon

Public works projects'
Dam2

No other details
Under construction

Cape Verde

Parliament buildin!f

Agreement signed

Congo

Hydropower station
and transmission lines4
Naval yard
technicians 5

Inaugurated: projects
started in 1973
Recently sent

Equatorial Guinea Radio technicians6
Communication
project7

Recently sent
Finished and handed
over

Madagascar

Hydroelectric stations

Talks held recently

Malagasy Republic Hydroelectric station9

No details

Mali

Dams'0
Radio transmitter"
Factory'2

Protocal signed for 3
dams
For use by Foreign
Ministry
Under construction

Mauritania

Hydroelectric plant'3

No details available

Mauritius

Airport and
terminal 14
building

Agreement signed

Niger

Reservoir project15

Work in progress

Sierra Leone ·

Stadium'6

Just opened

Somalia

Water project'7

Completed; will be
used by 30,000 people

Tanzania

Coal survey's

Found 50 million tons
of coal

Upper Volta

Stadium19

Experts arrived to begin construction
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Zaire

People's Palace20
Farm implements,
factory 21

Work in progress
Finished

Zambia

Textile Mill 22

Foundation laid

Sources:
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1. Manchester Guardian, February 25, 1979, p. 12. 2. NCNA, November 21,
1979, cited in FBIS, December 7, 1979, p. 12. 3. AFP, December 15, 1979,
cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10. 4. NCNA, December 28, 1979,
cited in FBIS, July 17, 1979, p. 15. 5. NCNA, August 13, 1979, cited in China
Aktuell, August 1979, p. 10. 6. NCNA, September 28, 1979, cited in China
Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 8. NCNA, June 14, 1979, cited in China Aktuell,
June 1979, p. 12. 9. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 28, 1979, p.
34. 10. AFP, June 8, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 20, 1979, p. 11. 11. Ibid 12.
Ibid. 13. NCNA, April10, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April1979, p. 10. 14.
NCNA, January 25, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 15.
NCNA, November 6, 1979, cited in China Akt!tell, November 1979, p. 11. 16.
NCNA, April19, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April1979, p. 10. 17. NCNA,
July 25, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 26, 1979, p. 11. 18. NCNA, January 13,
1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 19. NCNA, March 6, 1979,
cited in China Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7. 20. NCNA, January 18, 1979, cited
in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 21. NCNA, July 24, 1979, June 1979,
p. 12. 22. NCNA, January 14, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p.

5.
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TABLE 16

China's Project Aid to African Countries in 1980
(excluding agricultural projects)
Recipient

Kind of Project

Comments

Benin

Sports complex'

Under construction

2

Burundi

Highway

Congo

Boat building yard3

Equitorial Guinea Tele-communications
project4
Madagascar

Bridges5

Ground breaking ceremony held
Equipment and technicians furnished
Handed over
Work started

Malagasy Republic Highway 6
Mali
Dam reconstruction 7

Under construction
Finished and turned
over

Mauritania

Started; will seat
10,000

Stadium8

Niger

Finished and handed
over

Nigeria

Well drilling project 10

Protocol signed

Rwanda

Cement plant"

Started

Senegal

Dam12

Foundation ceremony
held to be 31/2 year
project to make useable 5,6000 hectares of
land

Sierra Leone

Office building'3

34 engineers and technicians sent

Somalia

Water conservation
project'4

Under construction

CHINA's FoREIGN

Tanzania

Zambia
Sources:
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Building to serve as
headquarters for Revolutionary Party of
Tanzania 15

Protocol signed

Expansion of farm implements factory 16

Handed over; raised
capacity from 1,000 to
3,700 tons

Road bridge 17

Work in progress

1. NCNA, April 10, 1980, cited in FBIS April 14, 1980, p. 11. 2. NCNA,
August 27, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, January 1980, p. 8. 4. NCNA,
August 4, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 5. NCNA, July 12,
1980, cited in FBIS, July 23, 1980, p. E4. 7. NCNA, May 17, 1980, cited in
China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9. 8. NCNA, January 23, 1980, cited in China
Aktuell, .January 1980, p. 8. 9. NCNA, June 1~, 1980, cited in China Aktuell,
June 1980, p. 9. 10. NCNA, June 19, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, June
1980, p. 9. 11. NCNA, July 24, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 9.
12. NCNA, May 8, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9. 13.
Hangzhou Radio, October 6, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, October 1980, p. 9.
14. NCNA, August 31, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 15.
NCNA, March 6, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, March 1980, p. 27. 16. NCNA,
July 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 9. 17. NCNA, July 28,
1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 7.
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TABLE 17
China's Agricultural Aid to African Nations in 1979

Recipient

Kind and/or Amount of Aid

Benin

Agricultural team completed
work'

Madagascar

Experimental rice and
vegetable 2 growing area
turned over

Mauritania

50 agricultural machines give,
incl. 12 tractors and 4
harvesters3

Niger

Agricultural
projected
4
completed
Rice mill handed over5

No further details

Senegal

Agricultural projects handed
over6

Included wells,
irrigation & water conservation
projects

Sierra Leone

Ground breaking ceremony for
sugar milF
Pumping station completed8

Capacity of 400
tons

Comment

20 technicians
also trained

Sources: 1. NCNA, September 25, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, September 1979, p.
12. 2. NCNA, December 18, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10. 3.
Nouakchott Radio, March 19, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7.
5. NCNA, December 2, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10. 6.
NCNA, May 2, 1979 cited in China Aktuell, May 1979, p. 12; see also FBIS
May 17, 1979, p. 14. 7. NCNA, March 2, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, March
1979, p. 7. 8. NCNA, November 4, 1979 cited in China Aktuell, NovE:mber
1979, p. 11.
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TABLE 18
China's Agricultural Aid to Mrican Countries in 1980
Recipient

-Kind and/or Amount of Aid

Comment

Benin

Paddy rice project'

Finished and
turned over

Ghana

Irrigation and rice cultivation
projects2

Under construction

Mauritania

Field improvement project3

Completed

Niger

Reclamation for paddy rice
fields 4

Completed

Rwanda

Reservoirs and rice mills
under construction5

Under construction

Zaire

Agricultural technicians6

On the job

Agricultural stations7

Covering 25,000
hecters

Sources:

1. NCNA, November 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, December 1980, p. 7.
2. NCNA, February 10, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, February 1980, p. 7.
5. NCNA, November 20, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, November 1980, p.
8. 6. NCNA, July 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 11. 7.
Zaire Press Agency, July 29, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p.
7.
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TABLE 19
China's Medical Aid to African Countries in 1979

Recipient

Kind and/or Amount of Aid

Benin

Medical team 1

Congo

Medicine and medical equipment worth 37 million African
Francs2

Equatorial
Guinea

Medical team3

Gambia

Medical team4

Guinea

Medical training program

Madagascar

Medical team 6

Mali

Medical team 7

Mauritania

Health care center opened8

Comment
Given free

Mission completed

Hospital turned over9
Morocco

Medical team 10

Sierra Leone

Hospital
polyclinic 11

Tanzania

Agreement to sent 60 doctors 12

turned

into

New medical team arrived13
Togo

Medical team 14

Zaire

Medical team 15

Sources:

1. NCNA, December 26, 1979, cited in FBIS, December 27, 1979, p. 14. 2.
NCNA, October 27, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 3.
NCNA, September 28, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, September 1979, p. 12.
4. NCNA, October 30, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 5.
NCNA, August 11, 1979, cited in FBIS August 16, 1979, p. 12. 6. NCNA,
October 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 7. NCNA,
November 10, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, November 1979, p. 11. 8. NCNA,
January 5, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 9. NCNA,
December 11, 1979, p. 10. 10. NCNA, September 26, 1979, cited in FBIS,
September 28, 1979, p. 11. 11. NCNA, January 13, 1979, cited in China
Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 12. NCNA, January 13, 1979, cited in China
Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 13. NCNA, March 22, 1979, cited in China
Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7. 14. NCNA, May 11, 1979, cited in China Aktuell,
May 1979, p. 12. 15. NCNA, November 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell,
November 1979, p. 11.
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TABLE 20
China's Medical Aid to African Countries in 1980
Recipient

Kind and/or Amount of Aid

Comment

Algeria

202 medical personel sent 1

Incl. medical
research work

Bostswana

Medical team sent2

Cameroon

Medical team sent3

Morocco

Two medical teams sent4

Niger

Medical team sent5

Sierra Leone

Medical team sent6

Somolia

Medical team sent7

Sudan

Medical team sent8

Sources:

1. Algiers Radio, July 9, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 8. 2.

NCNA, June 11, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, June 1980, p. 9. 3. NCNA,
January 31, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, January 1980, p. 8. 4. NCNA,
June 9, 1980, cited in FBIS, June 18, 1980, p. A5. 5. NCNA, July 12,
1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 8. 6. NCNA, May 10, 1980,
cited in FBIS, May 13, 1980, p. E2. 7. NCNA, October 19, 1980, cited in
China Aktuell, October 1980, p. 8. 8. NCNA, July 12, 1980, cited in China
Aktuell, July 1980, p. 8.
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TABLE 21
China's Aid to Countries in Other Regions During 1979
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Jamaica
Malta
Morocco
North Yemen
South Yemen
Syria
Tunisia

TABLE 22
China's Aid to Countries in Other Regions During 1980
Algeria
Egypt
Guyana
Iraq
Malta
Morocco
North Yemen
South Yemen
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